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Introduction
Not only the usual suspects such as the OECD (2002), but even prominent globalization critics argue that the case for attracting FDI is compelling: "Such investment brings with it not only resources, but technology, access to markets, and (hopefully) valuable training, an improvement in human capital" (Stiglitz 2000 (Stiglitz : 1076 . Hence, it is hardly surprising that UNCTAD has observed since the early 1990s
that the vast majority of policy measures relating to the entry and establishment of foreign investors aim at liberalizing and promoting FDI inflows, rather than restricting and regulating them. It is open to question, however, whether the intensified worldwide competition for FDI has reduced its traditionally strong concentration in highly developed host countries and a small number of large and relatively advanced emerging economies. On the one hand, Kekic (2009) posits a "distinct shift in the pattern of FDI", implying that "practice may be catching up to theory" according to which FDI should flow from capital-abundant rich countries to capital-scarce poor countries. According to UNCTAD, 2010 was the first year in which developed countries received less than half of global FDI inflows; "developing economies maintain their lead in 2013" (UNCTAD 2014: xiii) . On the other hand, skeptical observers point to a persistently strong concentration of FDI stocks (e.g., Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2013) . On both sides of the debate, assessments are typically based on just a few simple indicators such as the share of selected country groups in total FDI, while systematic analyses of changes in the concentration of FDI continue to be lacking. We attempt to fill this gap by constructing 1 For details, see UNCTAD's Investment Policy Monitor, January 2015: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ Upload/Documents/IPM%20No%2013.pdf (accessed: November 2015) . See also Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2013: Figure 6 ).
decomposed Theil indices and tracking the changes in these indices during the period 1970-2013.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our methodical approach and our data.
We present our empirical results in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Method and data

Theil index: definition and decomposition
We measure the concentration of FDI inflows across host countries -or, equivalently, the inequality of host countries in terms of FDI inflows -by means of the Theil index. 2 In a generalized form, the Theil index is defined as:
is the share of country i (iI) in FDI inflows to all countries (with X i the inflow of FDI to country i); and w i denotes the relative weight of country i (with The Theil index is equal to zero (no concentration) if each country's share in total FDI inflows x i is equal to its weight w i. ; it takes its maximal value ) / 1 ln( T max a w  I , with w a =min i w i , if all FDI inflows are concentrated in the country (or one of the countries) with the smallest weight. The relative weights affect the value of the index, i.e., the level of concentration, in two distinguishable ways: on the one hand they define a benchmark for assessing each country's share in global FDI inflows x i , and on the other hand they define the relative importance (weight) attributed to individual countries in summing up country-specific observations into a single index. 3 The Theil index figures most prominently among the so-called general entropy (GE) class of inequality measures. All GE measures satisfy a number of normative criteria, among which the additive decomposability of the measure is particularly important for our empirical analysis. Additive decomposability implies that, for any mutually exclusive (disjoint) and exhaustive set of subgroups of host countries, the total inequality across countries can be meaningfully decomposed into the inequality within these subgroups (within-group component) and the inequality between these subgroups (between-group component). 4 More specifically, the within-group component corresponds to a weighted sum of the levels of inequality between the countries within each group; 5 and the between-group component corresponds to the level of inequality between the different group averages. The decomposition property of the Theil index thus allows us to trace changes over time in the overall concentration of FDI inflows across countries to changes (differences) in the corresponding concentration within and between different subgroups of countries.
More specifically, with A, B, and C being three disjoint and exhaustive subsets of the set of all potential host countries I, the decomposition property of the Theil index (2) implies
where TW ABC is the within-group component, given by:
3 As discussed in more detail below, we will use two different definitions of weights throughout our analysis. 4 Other frequently used inequality measures, such as the Gini index or the coefficient of variation (CV) do not have this property. 5 In the case of the Theil index, the sum of these weights is always equal to one so that the within-group component is actually a weighted average of the group-specific inequality measures. 
As  A + B + C =1, the within-group component, TW ABC , is a weighted average of the Theil indices of the different subgroups with weights equal to the respective subgroup's share in total FDI inflows (in the following, A A T  will be referred to as group A's contribution to the within-group component).
The between-group component, TB ABC , is a Theil index itself, which results from assigning each country of a specific subgroup of countries the average FDI inflows of the countries of that subgroup.
It thus measures the inequality between the subgroups in terms of their countries' average FDI inflows.
Importantly, throughout the following analysis, we calculate two distinct variants of the Theil index corresponding to two different choices of relative weights in the definition of the generalised Theil index of equation (1) above. The first variant, the absolute Theil index, treats all countries symmetrically, irrespective of their size. It is given by the special case where the weights in equation
(1) are the same for all countries (w i = 1/I for all i). In this case, the country-specific attractiveness for FDI is given by absolute amounts of FDI inflows and the aggregation of country-specific observations into the absolute Theil index gives equal weights to all countries. 6 The second variant, the (population-weighted) relative Theil index, is obtained from equation (1) by setting each country's weight equal to its share in total population,
, where POP i is the population of country i. In contrast to the absolute Theil index, the relative Theil index accounts for the countries' population in two respects: (i) by measuring the country-specific attractiveness for FDI in terms of per-capita inflows of FDI, and (ii) by using the countries' population as weights when aggregating country-specific observations into the relative Theil index.
7 Note that the absolute Theil index is conceptually closer than the relative Theil index to the frequently mentioned high shares of a limited set of host countries in worldwide FDI flows, alluded to in the Introduction. However, the relative Theil index appears to be more appropriate to reveal the attractiveness for FDI of various small countries, which are minor hosts of absolute FDI inflows almost by definition. 8 At the same time, the aggregation of country-specific observations with population as weights appears to be better suited to assess the concentration of FDI from a global perspective. However, we consider Luxembourg and Switzerland as OECD countries.
Data source and some aggregate statistics
sharply in both incidents, whereas FDI inflows to OFCs and to non-OECD countries (excluding OFCs) continued to rise.
From Figure 1 , we also see that the OECD countries' share in total FDI inflows strongly decreased over time, while that of the other two groups strongly increased over time. 14 While this seems to suggest some convergence in the relative importance of different countries or country groups, a thorough analysis of this issue should go far beyond such aggregate analysis. Not only should it take into account differences in the number of countries and in the population of the different country groups, but it should also take into account changes in the concentration of FDI inflows within the different country groups. The following section will do so by looking at the development of absolute and relative Theil indices of concentration and their decompositions along different country groups and subgroups.
Results on FDI concentration Overall concentration: measurement matters
For a start, we assess the concentration of FDI for our overall sample of 196 host countries. For each 4-year interval we differentiate between two subsets of countries: Z={i | X i = 0}, i.e., the subset of countries that attracted zero FDI inflows over the given time period; and P={i | X i > 0}, i.e., the subset of countries with strictly positive (nonzero) FDI inflows over that period. In this specific case the decomposition of the Theil index of overall concentration (equations (2)- (4)) simplifies to:
14 For details on the development of FDI inflows for the different subgroups see Table A1 in the Appendix. 15 In deriving equations (6) and (7) we make use of the fact that for subset P the weight ω P from equation (3) 17 Consequently, the value of the intensive margin of concentration closely resembled the value of overall concentration since the early 1990s. 17 The pronounced decline of the extensive margin in 1978-1981 for the relative measure in the right panel of Figure 2 was associated with China's opening-up to FDI. Note that the Chinese case illustrates one of the main differences between the absolute and the relative measures of concentration. For the absolute measure, China counts as just one out of 196 countries. For the relative measure, China represents a heavyweight with almost 20% of total population. In the right panel of Figure 2 China's opening-up to FDI thus led to a strong decrease in the extensive margin (20% of world population now receive FDI), but also to a notable increase in the intensive margin (20% of world population received still quite low per-capita inflows).
OFCs: minor impact on overall concentration
In the next step of our analysis, we assess the role of OFCs for the development of overall concentration portrayed above. A priori it is hard to tell whether OFCs should be expected to have an important impact on overall concentration. As for their effect on the absolute Theil index, OFCs, on the one hand, account for almost 20 percent of countries in our sample (37 of the 196) giving them a relatively high weight. On the other hand, FDI inflows per country were not much different for the OFCs than for the group of all countries (Table A1) suggesting that their effect on the absolute Theil index for overall concentration may actually be small. For the relative Theil index, by contrast, the aggregate weight of the OFCs is very low (in the last sub-period all OFCs together accounted for only about 0.5 percent of the aggregate population of all countries in the sample), whereas their percapita inflows of FDI were exceptionally high (Table A1) . Moreover, increased per-capita inflows resulted in a widening gap compared to other host countries, notably in the last sub-period when FDI flows to OFCs strongly increased while overall FDI flows strongly decreased (Table A1) .
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that OFCs have just a marginal effect on the level and development of overall concentration as measured by the absolute Theil index. The curves for the overall sample of 196 countries, including the 37 OFCs, and for the reduced sample after excluding the OFCs closely resemble each other in the left panel of Figure 3 . This also holds for the comparison of the relative Theil indices for the full and the reduced country samples from the beginning of our observation period until the early 2000s. However, the two curves in the right panel deviate considerably during the two last sub-periods (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Specifically, the relative Theil index appears to be trending downwards at least since its temporary peak around the turn of the century (and possibly even since the early 1990s) when excluding the OFCs. 18 Importantly, this implies that the recent development of relative concentration becomes much more similar to the recent development of absolute concentration once the sample is reduced by excluding OFCs. After excluding OFCs, both the absolute and the relative measure of concentration clearly decreased at least since the beginning of the century and were substantially lower at the end of our period of observation than at its beginning.
OECD vs. non-OECD countries: convergence from the top
The subsequent steps of our analysis are based on the reduced sample after excluding OFCs (the corresponding set of countries is denoted by I\F). 19 In this sub-section, we decompose the (absolute and relative) Theil indices for the 159 remaining sample countries according to OECD membership as of 1993. 20 The distinction between traditional OECD countries and the typically less advanced other host countries is clearly relevant to assess whether FDI has increasingly become global. It is well known that traditional OECD countries absorbed large shares of worldwide FDI in the past. It is also widely reported, as mentioned in the Introduction, that FDI flows have shifted toward non-OECD hosts recently (see also Figure 1 ). 21 The following analysis will show that this shift can indeed explain 18 The difference between the relative Theil indices in panel b of Figure 3 can be attributed to two OFC-related developments in the last sub-periods: First, when decomposing the overall index between OFCs and all other countries in our sample, the between-group component increased considerably (not shown). This is due to the above noted widening gap in terms of per-capita FDI inflows in favor of OFCs. Second, concentration strongly increased within the subgroup of OFCs, which together with the OFC's increasing share of total FDI inflows, implies that the OFCs' contribution to the within component of overall concentration increased as well. These two factors are no longer pushing overall relative concentration upwards once OFCs are excluded. 19 We prefer excluding OFCs from our further analysis since their -limited -effects on overall concentration do not offer relevant insights on whether FDI has become more global in the sense of increasingly involving host countries across the developing world. Mostly, OFCs serve only as stop-over destinations rather than final destinations of FDI and it is generally unknown where FDI flows channeled through OFCs are ultimately used for investment. 20 The large and heterogeneous group of non-OECD countries will be further decomposed in the next subsections. 21 At the beginning of our observation period, the 23 OECD members accounted for more than 75 percent of FDI inflows to all 159 remaining sample countries. In the last sub-period 2010-2013, the 136 non-OECD countries have increased their share to almost 50% (Table A1 ).
a substantial part of the decline in overall concentration documented in the preceding sub-section. It will also show, however, that there were other important factors at work as well.
As indicated above, total inequality across countries can be meaningfully decomposed into the inequality within subgroups (here: OECD and non-OECD countries, indexed O and N, respectively) and the inequality between these subgroups. Specifically, applying equations (2)- (4) lows were all largely due to strong changes in the level of FDI inflows to the OECD countries, the strong decline of the between-group component in the early and mid-1990s was largely due to a particularly strong increase (by more than 600 percent) in FDI inflows to the non-OECD countries.
Turning to the within-group component we observe that for the absolute Theil index, the within- Figure 4) . Overall, the within-group component of the absolute Theil index was slightly higher in the last sub-period than in the first one. This is even though the absolute concentration of FDI inflows decreased slightly within both subgroups.
For the relative Theil index, by contrast, the within-group component was lower at the end of the observation period than at its beginning. That decline was almost exclusively due to a strong decline during the second half of the 1980s, which, in turn, was exclusively due to a very strong decrease in Despite this convergence, differences in FDI inflows between OECD countries and non-OECD countries, both per country and per capita, were still pretty large even at the end of our observation period. 23 And even though the OECD's share, O  , in total FDI inflows appeared to be trending downwards, it fluctuated heavily. Given the large volatility of O  it cannot be taken for granted that 22 While the relative concentration of inflows across the non-OECD countries, T N , continued to strongly decrease throughout most of the 1990s, the effect of that decrease on the within-group component of the overall relative Theil index, T I\F , was overcompensated after the end of the 1990s by the increasing share of inflows to non-OECD countries,  N . As the concentration of FDI inflows across the non-OECD countries was higher than that across the OECD countries, any increase in  N , ceteris paribus, increased the within-group component of overall concentration. 23 Both per-country inflows and per-capita inflows to the OECD were still more than six times higher than those to the non-OECD in the last sub-period, 2010-2013 (Table A1) .
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the decline of that share, and the convergence from the top more generally, will prove to be a longer-term, or even permanent phenomenon. This is even more so as the strong decline of the OECD countries' share in FDI inflows since the turn of the millennium (from almost 80% in [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] to slightly more than 50% in 2010-2013) seems to be due mostly to a specific weakness of the OECD countries in the recessions of the early 2000s and after the financial meltdown of 2008, rather than to a particularly strong growth of FDI inflows to the non-OECD countries. It may therefore prove premature to conclude that globalized FDI patterns necessarily allow non-OECD countries to close the traditional gap in attractiveness to FDI.
Non-OECD subgroups: decreasing concentration at least since the 1980s
When stressing the "central challenge" to mobilize FDI as a major source of financing sustained While non-OECD G20 members stand out with regard to their size and strategic importance (for foreign investors and governments), the transition countries entered the competition for FDI only after the regime change at the beginning of the 1990s. Assessing changes in concentration within and between these subgroups can thus be expected to offer more specific insights.
Denoting the subsets of the G20 members, the transition countries and the other non-OECD countries by G, T and R, respectively, we can once again apply equations (2)- (4) In the light of the UN's above noted concerns, one might suspect that overall concentration for the remaining non-OECD sample is driven mainly by the between-group components of the Theil indices.
However, Figure 5 shows that this conjecture is only partially confirmed for the absolute Theil index (panel a), and is not confirmed at all for the relative Theil index (panel b).
The peak in overall absolute concentration in the first half of the 1980s as well as its increase in the most recent sub-period coincided with corresponding changes in the between-group component, i.e., (temporary) increases in the inequality of FDI inflows per country between the three country groups.
26 Throughout the period of observation, the between-group component of absolute concentration appears to be relatively high, reflecting the fact that (average) FDI inflows per-country are very much higher for the G20 countries than for two other country groups. 27 In marked contrast, the between-group component of the relative Theil index was close to zero throughout the observation period (panel b).
The strikingly different role of the between-group components for the absolute and relative Theil indices is mainly because the G20 members represent just 10 countries in the large sample of 136 non-OECD countries, whereas they account for almost 60 percent of the population living in all non-OECD countries. As a consequence, FDI inflows per country are very much higher for the group of G20 members than those for the other two groups, while FDI inflows per capita are of a similar level as those of the other groups. Most surprisingly perhaps, the large and heterogeneous group of (98) other non-OECD countries, R, were almost as successful as the G20 members in terms of attracting per-capita FDI inflows. And per-capita inflows to the transition countries were even substantially higher than those to the G20 member countries, arguably rebutting the fears expressed by the Monterrey Consensus (see above) at least partially. While it was only in the early-2000s that the level of overall absolute concentration fell below its level observed in the 1970s, the decline in relative concentration started earlier and was fairly steep from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s (upper panels of Figure 5 ). The size and the development over time of the relative concentration measure across all non-OECD countries was almost identical to that of its within-group component, which in turn was largely determined by the contribution of G20 members (panel b). Specifically, the strong peak of overall concentration in 1982-1985 corresponds to both a strong increase in the share of G20 members in total FDI inflows and a strong peak in the relative concentration of inflows across the G20 members. And the strong decrease in relative overall concentration since the mid-1980s largely reflects the strong decrease in relative concentration across G20 members.
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The lower panels of Figure 5 reveal that the concentration across non-OECD countries declined, for all three subgroups and for both the absolute and relative measures, when comparing the beginning and the end of our period of observation. 29 Yet, there are notable differences across country groups.
For the group of G20 members, concentration strongly depends on measurement: inequality across G20 members in terms of per-capita inflows (relative concentration) has been much larger (at the beginning of the observation period) and has declined much stronger than inequality in terms of percountry inflows (absolute concentration). For the transition countries, both absolute and relative concentration declined sharply, notably during the first years after the regime change in 1990. 30 For the other non-OECD countries, which will be analyzed in more detail in the subsequent section, the decline in concentration was less pronounced and of similar magnitude for the absolute and relative measures.
Low-income countries: finally converging?
In this section, we focus on the widespread concern that mainly poor countries could be on the losing end of the worldwide competition for FDI inflows (e.g., United Nations 2003). We therefore exclude the G20 members and transition countries from our further analysis and restrict our sample to the group of the 98 other non-OECD countries, R. Within that group we now distinguish low-and higher-income countries, and calculate the between-and within-group components of the (absolute and relative) Theil index in line with the general equations above. With L representing the lowincome group and H representing the higher-income group 31 we thus get:
29 This neglects the zero concentration for transition countries in the first sub-period which is economically meaningless, however, since there were no FDI inflows to any country in this group at that time. 30 Because of the low but increasing weight,  T , of transition countries during most of the observation period, the strong decline in concentration across transition countries had little effect on their contribution to the within-group component, however. The upper panels of Figure 6 indicate that the level of the between-group component is higher for the relative than for the absolute measure: the gap in FDI inflows between the higher-income countries and the low-income countries is larger for per-capita inflows than for per-country inflows, which simply reflects the fact that the population of low-income countries is larger on average than that of the higher-income countries. More importantly, the development over time of the absolute and the relative between-group components resemble each other quite closely. For both measures, we observe three distinct sub-periods: the between-group components and thus the gap between FDI inflows to the higher-income countries and those to the low-income countries (i) increased during the 1970s, (ii) changed only little during the 1980s and 1990s, and (iii) declined in the new 52 countries which the World Bank classifies as lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries. 1.4 billion people were living in L countries at the end of our period of observation, while 840 million people were living in H countries. 32 The decline in overall absolute concentration in the 1970s was exclusively due to decreasing concentration across low-income countries, however.
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millennium. Concerns that the low-income countries could be on the losing end of the increased competition for FDI inflows might be justified by the fact that the between-group component was still higher in the last sub-period (2010-2013) than in the first sub-period (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) . When considering the more recent past, however, FDI inflows to the low-income countries did not only grow faster (both per-country and per-capita) than those to the higher-income countries (as reflected in the decline of the between-group components in Figure 6 ); they even grew much faster than the inflows to any other country group analyzed in this paper (see last row of Table A1 ).
It thus seems that the low-income countries may finally have started to catch up to the other countries in terms of FDI inflows. Moreover, the lower panels of Figure 6 suggest that this recent development involved more than just a few low-income countries. In the longer run, both absolute and relative concentration strongly decreased across the 46 low-income countries (in particular since the mid-1980s). Focusing on the recent past when FDI inflows to the low-income countries have grown faster than those to the other country groups, absolute concentration slightly decreased, whereas relative concentration slightly increased (in the last sub-period). In other words, the recent catch-up of the low-income countries has not been accompanied by an increase, at least not by a strong increase, in the inequality of FDI inflows across the low-income countries. It seems that the catch-up process has not been limited to a few low-income countries only.
This last point is corroborated when decomposing the (absolute and relative) concentration of FDI inflows across the 46 low-income countries, T L , into its "intensive margin" and its "extensive margin" of concentration. 33 For both the absolute and the relative measure, the extensive margin of concentration has been decreasing since the mid-1980s and has been very low in the recent past.
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